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1. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
1.1 The value of descriptive analysis
Most of the descriptions of acoustic phenomena that I can give 
depend  on  my  perceptual  familiarity  with  them. I  can  notice  the 
difference between a C and a B (they sound different to me) when I am 
presented with them, even if I am not able to explain the physical basis 
of this difference, for instance by way of a description referring to the 
frequency of vibrations. The description and the analysis of  what  I 
hear, of what I have the impression of perceiving - independently from 
what I can learn from non-perceptual information, for instance from a 
book on  physics  -  belongs to  the  phenomenological  component  of 
philosophical research. A description of sounds which needs to refer to 
the concept of frequency would not be a phenomenological description, 
whereas a description of them in terms of their apparent pitch would be. 
What are the reasons that justify the adoption of a phenomenological 
approach in the philosophy of auditory perception?
(1) A detailed phenomenology of experience may constitute a 
preliminary  condition  of  a  metaphysical  or  epistemological 
approach. For  example,  in  the  case  of  the  reduction  of  a  given 
experiential object to simpler logical entities, or to entities that are 
epistemically more easily accessed (as in classic phenomenalism), a 
faithful preliminary description of the object in terms of its precise 
experiential characteristics cannot be dispensed with.
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If one thinks that some x can be reduced to some y, it is reasonable 
for one to wish to have the clearest possible idea of the way y appears in 
experience, bearing in mind that the reduction to y might possibly force 
one to modify one’s first impression. Of course, the example of reduction 
is merely an illustration. Even if one is not considering a metaphysical 
reduction of y, one must first draw upon the apparent characteristics of y 
that  one  (normally)  has  the  impression  of  grasping,  based  on  one’s 
experiences. It is often the case that these characteristics are employed 
merely with a view to establishing the reference of theoretical terms, and not 
in order to supply the meaning of these terms, considering that they might 
(possibly, not necessarily) no longer be needed once the essential properties 
of y are targeted  (Kripke 1972, 1982:   119-120, 142).  For instance, the 
reference to the term “heat” is fixed by the use of certain phenomenological 
characteristics,  but  metaphysically heat   is  independent  from  these 
characteristics.
(2) A similar observation can be made concerning certain psychological 
explanations. If one believes that there is no x, and that only ys really exists in 
the world, and if one is also under the impression that one is perceiving x, then 
it is obviously necessary to explain where this false impression comes from. 
If,  for  instance,  one  has  the  impression  that  one  is  perceiving  green 
objects, but comes to learn that some of these objects are not green but  red 
(say); then one is pushed to examine one’s own perceptual system in order 
to understand what is going wrong. Phenomenology has a heuristic value 
in the context of the psychology of perception: psychology often discovers 
new perceptual mechanisms by studying the discrepancies between the 
(physical)  description  of  the  stimulus  and  the  (phenomenological) 
description  of  perceptual  content. Hence the necessity,  at this stage, of 
commanding a fairly detailed description of such content.
(3)  Finally,  the  phenomenological  examination  of  auditory 
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experience is of interest in its own right: it presents us with a vast and 
complex  field  of  experience,  as  yet  insufficiently  explored  by 
philosophy (contrasting with the immense volume of analysis that has 
been devoted to the subject of color).
We use the term “phenomenology” in a broad sense that is neither 
technical nor dogmatic. We are not claiming to be representative of the official 
views of the historical phenomenological movement, nor do we claim to express 
the position of the authors who belong to this tradition (even though, from time 
to time, we may quote from some of these authors or make reference to their 
ideas). We merely wish to  provide a  description of  what we hear,  a 
faithful description of the content of auditory perception.
1.2 The nature of our analysis
In order to better understand what characterizes the phenomenological 
approach, let us consider the following case. John lifts his arm and hits a 
gong. Mary, who is in the next room, makes the following observation: 
“I’ve heard the sound of a gong”. Which John answers by saying: “The 
sound of the gong was the effect of my moving my arm”. Wherefrom Mary 
correctly infers: “Then I heard the effect of your moving your arm”. 
On the other hand, and on the basis of the information available to her, 
Mary cannot claim that she heard the sound of the gong to be the effect of 
the movement of John’s arm. Mary could have heard the same sound, but 
not as having been produced in such a way; if she restricts herself to what 
she hears, the same sound could have occurred by its own, without involving 
John’s arm movement in any way. The phenomenology of what she heard 
does not, in this case, include the conditions of the sound’s production. Here we 
draw inspiration from a distinction that is systematically used by Fred Dretske 
(1969) between simple perception  (that  of an object or of an event) and 
epistemic perception (in this instance, perceiving something as something else).
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 In fact, the use of the accounts of simple perception (“mary heard the 
sound of a gong”) does not suffice to enable one to seize or indicate the 
phenomenological complexity of the perceptual content. From hereon 
we shall apply two basic principles: first of all, phenomenological analysis 
considers  experiential  content  only;  secondly,  experiential  content  is 
normally  expressed by non-simple accounts (“to see that...”, to hear… 
as…”)
1.3 A few difficulties
We are still  left facing some difficulties,  however,  since these two 
principles  are  obviously  mere  general  guidelines. Phenomenological 
distinctions  could  slip  through  the  net  cast  upon  experience  by  a 
completive clause (that is to say, a clause which is introduced by “as”) 
if one assumes that it covers all experience. The phenomenological 
difference between seeing with one eye that the cat is on the mat, 
and seeing it with both eyes, does not necessarily correspond to a 
difference  in  the  clauses  that  are  used  in  order  to  report  the 
experience: in both cases, one sees that  the cat is on the mat. This 
phenomenological difference  can,  of  course,  be expressed through an 
adverb that modifies the verb from outside the clause (i.e., “with one eye” 
modifies the perceptual verb): this is precisely what we did in presenting 
our example. Nonetheless, the role of the adverb does not consist in 
describing the phenomenological difference at stake, but in specifying 
the considerations that make the difference discernible.
Moreover, certain types of content, especially analogical elements 
of  content,  are  normally  undetermined  when  compared  with  the 
concepts that may be used for their description, and this fact poses a 
problem  (Dretske,  1981,  Peacocke,  1986). If,  in  order  to  express 
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temporal characteristics, one makes use of a vocabulary which is limited 
to the names of the hours, then it is impossible to express with adequate 
precision, by means of the vocabulary, the perceptual content of seeing 
the short hand of a clock pointing to the position it should normally 
point to at 5:15 PM. In such a case, one might be able to say that the hand 
indicates a point between 3 and 4 o’clock PM, but this is no more than an 
approximation of what one really sees.
It  is  also  often  difficult  to  precisely  select  the  appropriate 
description of perceptual content. Whenever, for instance, one looks at 
the picture of a half full cup of coffee, the content of what is seen by 
means of the picture is that the cup is half full of coffee. But the purely 
pictorial content of the picture is, in a sense, poorer: the picture only 
represents  part  of  the  coffee  (a  mere  fraction  of  its  surface,  as  it 
happens). In fact, the picture does not lie, since it can only represent the 
coffee which is visible from the point of view from which the picture 
was taken. So, it seems that the perceptual content  exceeds the mere 
pictorial  content,  and  transcends  the  limits  imposed  on  the  pictorial 
content by the angle of vision. In spite of these difficulties,  we will 
continue to speak of perceptual content as that which can be expressed 
by  non-simple  accounts  of  perception,  assuming  that  there  is  no 
ambiguity.
1.4 Thought experiments.
We have acknowledged the value of phenomenological analysis, but we 
are not blind to its limitations, which we would like to show. It is clear 
that in certain cases, phenomenological description does not have the 
capacity  to  decide  between  conflicting  hypotheses  or  theories. For 
example: the acceptance of a representational theory of perception, 
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which claims that the direct objects of perception are sense data, and 
that  it  is  by  the  means  of  sense  data  that  perception  gives  us  an 
indirect access to external objects, is not threatened in any way by the 
fact  that  we  have  the  impression  of  directly  perceiving  external 
objects. The representational theory is not supposed to provide an explanation 
of what we have the impression of seeing, but of the structure of perception 
(see section 5.2).
Other precautions must be taken with respect to the phenomenological 
approach. By insisting too much on descriptive analysis, we run the risk of 
neglecting  the  distinction  between  those  aspects  of  the  phenomenon 
considered that are central or essential and those that are secondary or 
accidental. Since the phenomenon to be described is often considered in the light 
of a particular context, some of the relations to the context can be external, and not 
constituents of the phenomenon in question. Thus it is important to underline that 
the distinction between essential and accidental aspects of a phenomenon is not 
necessarily accessible from the point of view of descriptive phenomenology. 
This point holds for whatever interpretation of the distinction in question is 
found to be exact, be it grounded on the thing itself or on the conceptual 
level only.
What method(s) can we adopt in order to select the aspects that are 
constitutive of a phenomenon? In the present text, we will make liberal use of 
thought experiments in which the application of a concept is tested in an unusual 
context. Classical  phenomenologists  themselves  were  well  aware  of  the 
necessity of leaving the purely descriptive plane behind when distinguishing 
between essential and accidental elements of phenomena (see, for example, the 
insistence on the role of imagination in Husserl, 1913 § 70). Two kinds of 
thought experiment can be distinguished based on the way one acts upon the 
context. On  the  one  hand,  a  concept’s  context  of  application  can  be 
systematically impoverished. I.e., if a sound without a specific pitch cannot 
be conceived, then pitch must be considered to be an essential aspect of 
sound. In the same way, if a situation in which a perceptual experience is 
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causally independent from its object cannot be conceived, then causality should 
be credited with an essential role in perception. The history of philosophy 
abounds with examples of thought experiments in which the context of 
application of  a  certain concept  is  voluntarily impoverished. Berkeley 
tested the notion of experience in the case of an angelic, disembodied 
intelligence. Condillac  examined the  concept  of  sensory  modality  by 
imagining a statue which, in its initial condition, is utterly devoid of sense-
perception, and asked himself what features where missing in order to 
reproduce such or such an aspect of our perceptual faculty. The thought 
experiments proposed by Nicod or Strawson that we discuss in chapter 
10 are of this same kind.
On the other hand, a concept’s context of application can be systematically 
enriched. It is the case for the well known thought experiments of the 
Twin Earths (Putnam, 1975). One is to imagine a planet, Twin Earth, which 
is a quasi-perfect replica of our planet, except for a small number of relevant 
details: for instance, the liquid which makes up its seas and drips from its 
faucets has the superficial appearance of water, but its molecular structure is 
unheard of (not H2O, say, but XyZ). The value of these thought experiments 
consists in the possibility of testing our intuitions about the application of the 
concept of water to the Twin earth liquid. One of the relevant philosophical 
questions consists in ascertaining whether the correct application of our concept of 
water is sensitive to the molecular structure of the substance in cause. The thought 
experiments that involve a certain spatial or qualitative inversion and which we 
refer to in chapters 2, 7, and 9 belong to this second kind of experiment. The 
differences between the two kinds of experiment may be metaphorically 
summarized as follows: the use of impoverished contexts reveals the lower 
limits of the application of a concept, while the use of enriched contexts 
gives indication of the upper limits of the application of a concept.
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1. 5 Conceptual analysis and theoretical definition
 
In this context, language is the guiding thread. Analysis attempts to 
show up the criteria of application of a term used by a certain linguistic 
community, for which purpose it retraces the constitutive relationships 
between different concepts that are explicitly or implicitly used by the 
speaker  when  he  uses  that  particular  term. In  truth,  the  expression 
“conceptual analysis” has been used to designate a number of significantly 
different  philosophical  activities,  such  as  Austin’s  (1962)  ordinary 
language  philosophy  and  Strawson’s  (1985)  descriptive  metaphysics. 
Ordinary  language  philosophy is  often  reproached  for  neglecting  the 
distinction  between  essential  and  accidental  traits  of  a  concept  (a 
distinction  we  have  mentioned  above). It  is  true  that  this  form  of 
philosophy appears to restrict itself to collecting the idiosyncratic aspects 
of a term’s use by a given linguistic community, without exploring the 
speakers’ intuitions concerning the application of the term in less ordinary 
contexts  such  as  those  that  are  considered  in  thought  experiments. 
Descriptive metaphysics, on the other hand, aims for a higher degree of 
universality, partly by using this kind of experiment.
Generally  speaking,  the  conceptual  analysis  of  a  term  is  an 
attempt to explain the relationship between its use, on the one hand, 
and the beliefs and intuitions of the speakers who make use of it on 
the other  (Neander, 1991:§2). In this sense, conceptual analysis does 
not necessarily result in a theoretical definition, which should provide 
the extension of a term by isolating, wherever possible, the essential 
properties of the members of the said extension. When a term has no 
extension, as is the case of “phlogiston”, it is not possible to provide a 
theoretical  definition  for  it,  but  this  fact  does  not  prevent  us  from 
supplying a conceptual analysis, if, for instance, we want to make the 
internal  contradictions  of  the  concept  manifest  to  a  speaker  who is 
convinced  of  the  existence  of  phlogiston. Another  interesting 
divergence  between  conceptual  analysis  and  theoretical  definition 
concerns the limitations affecting the application of ordinary concepts. 
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Certain  thought  experiments  can  reveal  the  limitations  of  the 
speakers’  intuitions  concerning  the  application  of  a  term. These 
limitations can be revealed either by the fact that different speakers’ 
intuitions do not match, or by the fact that these intuitions are totally 
lacking. In such a situation, a theoretical definition may result from a 
stipulation as to the precise extension of the term. For instance, such a 
stipulation  may  enable  the  physicist  to  consider  the  possibility  of 
broadening the concept of sound so as to include inaudible mechanical 
vibrations, such as ultrasounds.
